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THE OPEN DOOR:
WILL THE RIGHT TO DME SURVIVE WASHINGTON V.
GLUCKSBERG
1 AND VACCO V. QUILL?
2
Adam J. Cohen*
"I think it was afar more encouraging result than
almost anyone expected. And the Court, far from
slamming the door, in fact, ifyou look at it carefully.
left it open by a vote of nine to nothing.
INTRODUCTION
On May 12, 1995, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the
issuance of a permanent injunction forbidding Dr. Jack Kevorkian
"from employing any device to assist a person in conmitting
'suicide."4 After a brief legal discussion, the unanimous court
vauntingly concluded with the following admonition:
Defendant stated under oath that he would continue to
aid in suicides.... Defendant has made clear that he
stands ready to assist people in ending their lives.
Defendant has made clear that neither the actions of
the Legislature, the executive branch, nor the judiciary
will sway him from his course. We will see.'
* Candidate for J.D., Cornell Law School, May 1998; B.A. in Psychology, Vassar
College. I am indebted to Professor Lawrence I. Palmer for his valuable insight.
117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
2 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
' Statement of Laurence Tribe, NPR Morning Edition: Supreme Court Rulings
(National Public Radio broadcast, June 27, 1997).
4 People v. Kevorkian, 210 Mich. App. 601 (1995), affdNo. 90-390963, slip op.
(Mich. Cir. Ct., Feb. 5, 1991), appeal denied, 451 Mich. 874 (1996), and cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 296 (1996).
5 Id. at 608.
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Since the original issuance of that injunction, Kevorkian has openly
assisted the suicides of approximately 100 persons.6 After six failed
prosecutions, authorities have virtually abandoned the effort to stop
him.' Even his detractors must concede that Kevorkian's strategy of
vindicating the "right to die" on behalf of those for whom he provides
assistance-resolute disobedience of, and flagrant disrespect for, the
law-has proven extremely successful.
Most other assisted-suicide advocates, however, have attempted
to initiate change in the law9 rather than clash with it so dramatically.
Shortly after Washington voters rejected an initiative to legalize
physician-assisted suicide in 1991,10 one of the attorneys who had
6 Lawyer Puts Kevorkian Cases at 'Nearly 100', N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1997, at
A21.
' Prosecutors Say They Won't Charge 'Dr. Death' Unless Changes Are Made;
For Now, Law Holds No Sting For Kevorkian, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 17, 1997, at N23.
One county prosecutor has met with Kevorkian to arrange "more dignified" ways
for him to deliver the bodies of the persons he assists in suicide. Kristin Storey,
Kevorkian, Marlinga Work on Better Plan for Dropping Off Bodies, DETROIT
NEWS, Oct. 7, 1997, at D3.
I See also Kevorkian Burns Order to Stop Assisting Suicides, CI. TRi., Apr. 5,
1997, at N16; Kevorkian Dresses as Jefferson at New Trial, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr.
2, 1996, at 8. Once asked by commentator Andy Rooney why he seemed to get
enjoyment out of his criminal trials, Kevorkian explained, "What looks like
enjoyment is the sneer of contempt. It's not a smile." 60 Minutes: Andy Rooney
(CBS television broadcast, May 19, 1996).
' It should be noted that four states-Maryland, Ohio, Vermont, and
Virginia--have no common law or statutory prohibition against assisting a suicide.
Ohio even has explicit authority supporting its legality. See State v. Sage, 31 Ohio
St. 3d 173, 177-78 (1987); City of Akron v. Head, 73 Ohio Misc. 2d 67, 70 n.4
(Ohio Mun. 1995). The attorney general of Maryland believes that despite
confusion in the state's law, assisting a suicide is probably illegal there. See 93 Op.
Md. Att'y Gen. 36 (1993). Bills have been introduced to legalize physician-assisted
suicide in Vermont, see H.B. 109, 64th Biennial Sess. (Vt. 1997), and to
criminalize it in Virginia, see H.B. 277, Reg. Sess. (Va. 1996).




drafted the initiative, Kathryn L. Tucker, mobilized other right-to-die
advocates for two momentous court challenges." These lawsuits,
brought in Washington 2 and New York, 3 were part of a national
strategy designed to compel the U.S. Supreme Court to review the
constitutionality of laws forbidding physicians from assisting their
patients' suicides.14 When the Court did so, it unsurprisingly held that
the U.S. Constitution did not recognize a general right to physician-
assisted suicide.'5 However, the Court did not conclusively bar the
possibility that in any individual instance of requested suicide
assistance, such a right might exist. Instead, it explicitly left open the
possibility that "a more particularized challenge" than that which the
reformers had brought might succeed. 6 Laurence H. Tribe, who
argued the New York case before the Supreme Court, has described
this loophole as having "the primary effect of leaving open for the
future the drawing of all the difficult lines in this complicated and
sensitive area.... The Court, far from slamming the door, in fact left
it open."' 7
This Comment examines that "open door," which apparently
invites future federal constitutional challenges.' Part I offers a
" Thomas Maier, Making a Case for Suicide Aid: For High Court. Historic
Chance to Decide Issue of Right to Die, NEWSDAY, Jan. 5, 1997, at A4.
2 See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D.Wash.
1994), affd in part, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev'd sub nom.,
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. 2258 (1997).
'3 See Quill v. Koppel, 870 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd in part sub nom.,
Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd in part, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
4 William Carlsen, When Patients Choose to Die: Seattle Group Gives Assisted
Suicide Momentum in Courts, S.F. CHRON., June 3, 1996, at Al. The strategy was
to have enough Circuit Courts of Appeal issue opinions on the issue that the Court
would be forced to address their conflicting outcomes and/or legal approaches. Id.
11 See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2275; Quill, 117 S.Ct. at 2301-02.
16 See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at2275 n.24; Quill, 117 S.Ct. 2293,2302 n.13; see
discussion, supra, Part III.A.
17 John Farrell, No Absolute "Right to Die, " Supreme Court Rules; Bans Upheld
on Assisted Suicides; Issue is Left Open, BOSTON GLOBE, June 27, 1997, at Al.
s This Comment does not consider the assertion of such a right predicated on a
state's constitution. State constitutional provisions can provide significantly more
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general overview of the Washington and New York lawsuits, while
Part II examines how the Supreme Court majority ultimately decided
them. Part III analyzes the Court's concurring opinions which, jointly
and as incorporated into the Court's holdings through two critical
footnotes, apparently create the "open door." Part IV synthesizes the
Court's various opinions, outlines a post-Glucksberg challenge to an
assisted suicide statute, and examines a recent state court decision
which might have been the first test of the "open door."
I. LOWER COURT DECISIONS
Several factors influenced the Glucksberg and Quill litigation.
First, the national controversy would not have escalated as it had
without the overwhelming public interest in Jack Kevorkian. 19
Although neither Kevorkian himself," nor his conduct,2' were
expansive protections than their federal counterpart, even if identically worded. See
generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1977). To date, however, no state
constitutional physician-assisted suicide challenge has succeeded. See Kevorkian
v. Arnett, 939 F. Supp. 725, 731-32 (C.D. Cal. 1996); Krischer v. Mclver, 697 So.
2d 97 (Fla. 1997); State v. Kevorkian, 447 Mich. 436 (1994); Donaldson v.
Lundgren, 2 Cal. App. 4th 1614 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
19 In fact, terms like "right to die," "death with dignity," and "physician-assisted
suicide" had generally been the jargon of academics and special interest groups
until the media attention surrounding two 1990 events brought them into the
national discourse: Janet Adkins's becoming the first to use Kevorkian's "suicide
machine" on June 4, 1990, and the Supreme Court's decision in Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (addressing the right to remove life
support systems from a vegetative patient).
20 The Supreme Court has twice declined to review cases to which Kevorkian was
a party. See Kevorkian v. Michigan, 117 S. Ct. 296 (1996), denying cert. to 210
Mich. App. 601 (1995) (upholding injunction against suicide assistance);
Kevorkian v. Michigan, 115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995), denying cert. to 447 Mich. 436
(1994) (upholding validity of state assisted suicide ban).
21 These cases challenged the constitutionality of laws prohibiting physicians from
prescribing lethal medications to their mentally competent, terminally ill patients
for them to self-ingest. See Quill v. Vacco, 870 F. Supp. 78, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1994);
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1456 (W.D.Wash. 1994).
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directly involved in this litigation, his shadow undeniably loomed
over it, influencing the manner in which it was framed, and, perhaps,
decided. The cases also concerned one of the few social issues more
controversial than physician-assisted suicide itself: the Supreme
Court's abortion jurisprudence, namely Planned Parenthood v.
Casey.' Finally, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health,23 the
only Supreme Court "right to die" case at the reformers' disposal, set
the backdrop against which the lower courts would have to grapple
with the reformers' challenges.
A. The Due Process Challenge: Compassion in Dying v.
Washington
1. The District Court's Opinion
Compassion in Dying v. Washingto?4 challenged a Washington
statute which made it a felony to "knowingly cause[ or aid[] another
Kevorkian, however, is no longer a licensed physician, see Kevorkian v. Arnett,
939 F. Supp. 725, 728 & n.1 (C.D. Cal. 1996); and usually assists the suicides of
persons chronically rather than terminally ill. See Thomas Maier, Waiting at
Death's Door, NEWVSDAY, Sept. 8, 1996, at A50. Kevorkian employs syringes or
oxygen masks connected to lethal agents rather than written prescriptions. See
generally, JACK KEVORKIAN, PRESCRIPTION MEDICIDE: THE GOODNESS OF
PLANNED DEATH (1991).
2 505 U.S. 833 (1992). In Casey, the Supreme Court reviewed the
constitutionality of a number of restrictions which a state statute placed on
abortion. See idat 844. A plurality composed of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter reaffirmed what they described as the "essential holding" of Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973). Id at 846, 870-71.
2 497 U.S. 261 (1990). In Cruzan, the parents of a woman in a permanently
vegetative state sought to remove the feeding tube which kept her alive. Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, Id. at 267-68. Although the Supreme Court
stated it would "assume" the existence of a constitutional right to avoid unwanted
medical treatment, id. at 269, it ruled that a state's heightened evidentiary standard
for assessing a patient's wishes did not violate that right. Id. at 280-83.
24 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D.Wash. 1994), affdinpart, 79 F.3d790(9th Cir. 1996)
(en banc), rev'd sub nom., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
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person to attempt suicide."2 The plaintiffs included three mentally
competent, terminally ill persons;26 five physicians who regularly
treated terminally ill patients;27 and Compassion in Dying, a non-
profit organization which provided counseling to terminal patients
considering suicide.28 The plaintiffs challenged the statute both
facially and as applied to mentally competent adult patients with
terminal illnesses choosing to voluntarily hasten their deaths with
lethal doses of physician-prescribed medication.29 The District Court
ruled for the plaintiffs, invoking the assertion made in Casey that the
Due Process clause protected "the most intimate and personal choices
a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy[.]"30 The right of individuals with terminal illness to
obtain assistance in suicide, the Court reasoned, was an intimate
choice analogous to Casey's right to terminate pregnancy and
Cruzan's right to refuse treatment.3'
2. The Ninth Circuit's Opinion
A divided three-judge panel reversed the District Court's
holding on appeal, criticizing its interpretation of Casey as
21 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (1991). A conviction can result in five
years imprisonment and $10,000 fine. Id. §§ 9A.36.060(2), 9.20.020(I)(c) (1991).
26 Compassion, 850 F. Supp. at 1456-57. The patients, respectively suffering from
cancer, emphysema, and AIDS, averred that their diseases were incurable, that they
experienced unrelenting pain, and that they wished to obtain physician-prescribed
lethal medication in order to commit suicide. Id.
27 Id. at 1457-58.
28 Id. at 1458.
29 The plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment regarding the statute's invalidity and
injunctive relief against its enforcement. Id. at 1456. They did not challenge the
portion of the statute which forbid a person from "caus[ing]" a suicide.
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 797 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
30 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1459 (W.D. Wash.
1994) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
31 Id. at 1459-62. The Court also ruled that the statute violated the Equal
Protection Clause. See id. at 1466-67.
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"inherently unstable"32 and its judgment as "unheard-of.' 33 The
scathing opinion invoked several State interests, including preserving
the integrity of the medical profession;34 protecting patients from
"psychological pressure to consent to their own deaths; 3 5 preventing
the exploitation of individuals who are poor and/or minorities;36 and
protecting individuals with disabilities from "societal indifference and
apathy."37 The panel also identified the serious problems which have
arisen in the Netherlands, the only nation in the world to have
legalized physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia,38 and concluded
32 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 590 (9th Cir. 1995),
superseded by 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev'd sub nom., Washington
v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
"a Id. at 593.
14 Or as the panel described it, "[t]he interest in not having physicians in the role
of killers of their patients." 1d. at 592.
35 Id.
36 Id. Although there is little evidence that racial minorities would actually be
exploited by physician-assisted suicide, African-Americans are significantly less
likely to support its legalization than are members of other ethnic groups. See
Harold G. Koenig et al., Attitudes of Elderly Patients and Their Families Toward
Physician-Assisted Suicide, 156 ARCH. INT. MED. 2240-48 (1996); Panagiota V.
Caralis et al, The Influence of Ethnicity and Race on Attitudes Toward Advance
Directives, Life-Prolonging Treatments, and Euthanasia, 4 J. CLIN. ETHICs 155-65
(1993). While the reason for this disparity is unknown, it is apparently unrelated
to any lack of trust in health care workers or in the health care system. E.D.
McKinley et al., Differences in End-of-Life Decision Making Among Black and
White Ambulatory Cancer Patients, 11 J. GEN. INT. MED. 651-56 (1996).
31 Compassion, 49 F.3d at 592-93.
31 Over the last twenty-five years, Dutch courts have tolerated euthanasia based
on noodtoestand, a necessity defense. The rationale is that a physician stands with
her "back against the wall" due to her conflicting duties-to obey the law and to
relieve suffering. CARLOS GoMEZ, REGULATING DEATH: EUTHANASIA AND THE
CASE OF THE NETHERLANDS 37-38 (1991). The defense was first identified in the
case of Leeuwarden, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, 1973, No. 183 (Neth.), discussed
in Euthanasia Case Leeuwarden-1973, 3 Iss. L. & MED. 439 (Walter Lagerwey
trans., 1988) and later by the nation's highest court in Schoonheim, Nederlandse
Jurisprudentie, 1984, No. 106 (Neth.), discussed in Abstracts, 3 Iss. L. & MED. 455,
461 (Walter Lagerwey trans., 1988).
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that a State may validly act to prevent similar abuses in the United
States.39
3. The Ninth Circuit's En Banc Opinion
After rehearing the case en banc due to its "extraordinary
importance,"40 the Ninth Circuit reversed itself in an historic 8-3
decision.4' Judge Stephen Reinhardt, writing for the majority, framed
the issue as "whether a person who is terminally ill has a
constitutionally-protected liberty interest in hastening what might
otherwise be a protracted, undignified, and extremely painful
death."42 He observed that the common law condemnation of "self-
murder" imposed significantly reduced penalties for suicides
motivated by physical suffering,43 and only about half of the states
39 Compassion, 49 F.3d at 593. A delegation known as the Remmelink
Commission has found that euthanasia accounts for approximately 2,300 deaths,
or 1.8 % of all deaths, in the Netherlands annually. Henk A.M.J. ten Have & Jos
V.M. Welie, Euthanasia: Normal Medical Practice?, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
MariApr. 1992, at 34. Assisted suicide was found to be "relatively uncommon" at
400 instances per year. 1d. (These figures are somewhat small compared to the
9,000 annual requests for euthanasia. Id at 34-35). However, the Commission also
estimated that patients were euthanized without explicit request in approximately
1,000 instances per year. Id. at 35. The Commission nevertheless concluded that
euthanasia practice was stable, workable, and properly managed. Id at 34-35.
40 Compassion, 79 F.3d at 798.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 793. He made clear that this broadly-framed inquiry was the appropriate
one in light of the reasoning of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113. Compassion, 79 F.3d
at 801. As Judge Reinhardt noted, the Texas statutes struck down in Roe did not
directly prohibit abortion itself, but instead the act of "designedly administer[ing]
to a pregnant woman.., any drug or medicine [to] procure an abortion," Roe, 410
U.S. at I 18-effectively, physician-assisted abortion.
4 Compassion, 79 F.3d at 808-09 (citing Thomas J. Marzen, Suicide: A
Constitutional Right, 24 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 58-59, 61 (1985)). While the usual
penalty for suicide was forfeiture of real and personal property to the crown,
persons moved to suicide by such suffering lost their personal property only. Id.
(citing 2 H. DE BRACTON ON LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 423-24 (:f. 150) (c.
1250) (G. Woodbine ed., S. Thome tr., 1968) and 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF
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ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 outlawed suicide."
Although today assisting a suicide is prohibited,45 suicide and
attempted suicide are no longer crimes in any state." Judge Reinhardt
also noted that no physician has ever been punished for assisting the
suicide of a patient47 despite studies that consistently reveal a "time-
honored but hidden" practice of physician-assisted suicide.48
Judge Reinhardt cited Cruzan, Casey, and Roe as examples of
the flexibility of the Supreme Court's "evolving doctrinal approach ''49
in substantive Due Process cases.5 Theorizing that because the
strength of the State's interest in life increases as a fetus approaches
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *54 (Garland Pub., Inc. 1979) (1628)).
44 Id. at 809 & n.42 (citing Marzen, supra note 43, at 76).
4s Id. at 810 (citing Julia Pugliese, Note, Don't Ask-Don't Tell: The Secret
Practice of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1291, 1295 (1993)).
Forty states prohibit assisted suicide by statute or common law. See Washington v.
Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. 2258,2287 n.14 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring in judgment)
(listing statutes); Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 428-29 (1877); People
v. Kevorkian, 447 Mich. 436,495 (1994); State v. Jones, 86 S.C. 17,29-30 (1910);
State v. Willis, 255 N.C. 473,477 (1961). The criminal negligence statutes of two
additional states arebroad enough to reach the practice, see Ala. Code § 13A-6-1
(1994); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-107 (Michie 1988), and four states plus the District
of Columbia refer taft as a crime in other statutes, see D.C. Code Ann. § 6-2428(a)
(1995); Idaho Code § 39-152 (1993); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 449.670 (1991); Utah Code
Ann. § 75-2-1118 (1993); W.Va. Code § 16-30-10 (1995). Assisted suicide may
be legal in the remaining four states. See supra note 9.
46 Compassion, 79 F.3d at 810 (citing Marzen, supra note 43, at 85). Technically,
suicide retains its common-law "criminal character" in over a dozen states despite
the abolition of all penalties. See, e.g., State v. Willis, 255 N.C. 473 (1961); May
v. Pennell, 101 Me. 56 (1906). In 1976, Washington became the last state to repeal
its statute prohibiting attempted suicide. See 1975 Wash. Laws, 1st Ex.Sess., ch.
260, § 9A.92.010 (eff. July 1, 1976), repealing WASH. REV. CODE § 9.80.020
(1961).
4 Compassion, 79 F.3d at 811.
48 Id. (citing Pugliese, supra note 45, at 1295).
49 Id. at 803-04 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848, citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
so Id. at 803-06.
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viability, it must decrease as a person's life approaches its end,' he
found that the State's interests in preserving life and preventing
suicide were only minimally implicated with regard to individuals
with terminal illnesses. 2 He also found that a physician's complicity
in a patient's suicide was difficult to distinguish from a form of care
for the dying known as "terminal sedation," in which doctors
administer medications with the intention of alleviating their patients'
intense pain but with the knowledge that they might also hasten
death. 3 Dismissing the State's remaining interests as meriting no
greater weight than in the treatment-refusal or abortion contexts,
4
Judge Reinhardt found them outweighed by the Due Process interests
of individuals with terminal illnesses.55
B. The Equal Protection Challenge: Quill v. Vacco
1. The District Court's Opinion
Quill v. Koppel 6 challenged two New York statutes which
respectively prohibited "intentionally caus[ing] or aid[ing] a
suicide"resulting in death5 7 and "promoting" an unsuccessful suicide
s' Id. at 800-01 n.13, 836-37.
" Id. at 816-24; accord Saikewicz v. Belchertown, 370 N.E. 2d 417, 426 n.1 1
(1977).
" Compassion, 79 F.3d at 823. Usually, though not always, doctors prescribe such
medication with their patients' consent. See Thomas A. Preston, Physician
Involvement in Life-Ending Practices, 18 PuGET SOUND. L. REV. 531, 539 (1995).
This "double effect" is both legal and ethical. See Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs, American Medical Association, Decisions Near the End of Life, 267 JAMA
2229 (1992).
54 Compassion, 79 F.3d at 825-32.
ss Id. at 836-37. The Court, therefore, did not reach the Equal Protection issue. Id.
at 838 n.138.
56 870 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd in part sub nom., Quill v. Vacco, 80
F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd in part, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
5' N.Y. Penal Law § 125.15(3) (McKinney 1994). A conviction can result in a
fine of $5,000 and fifteen years imprisonment. Id. §§ 70.00(2)(c), 80.00(1)(a).
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attempt.5" The plaintiffs included three mentally competent adults in
the final stages of terminal illnesses5 9 and three physicians who
alleged that, in certain circumstances, honoring patient requests to
hasten death was consistent with ethical standards.6 ° The plaintiffs'
Equal Protection and Due Process claims were virtually identical to
those asserted in the Washington litigation.6 The District Court
applied a "history and tradition" test 2 and concluded that the
historical rejection of assisted suicide as either legally sanctioned or
morally acceptable precluded the Due Process claim.63 The Court also
rejected the plaintiffs' Equal Protection argument, ruling that
intentionally bringing about the death of a patient rationally differs
from merely allowing a patient to die from withdrawal of treatment.
64
2. The Second Circuit's Opinion
On appeal, Judge Roger Miner agreed with the District Court
that it would be inappropriate to recognize a right to assisted suicide
given that it was not deeply rooted in the nation's history and
" N.Y. Penal Law § 120.30 (McKinney 1994). A conviction can result in a fine
of $5,000 and four years imprisonment. Id. §§ 70.00(2)(e), 80.00(1)(a). The Quill
plaintiffs did not challenge provisions allowing a person who "causes or aids [a]
suicide attempt by the use of duress or deception" to be prosecuted for murder
under § 120.35 or second-degree murder under § 125.25(1)(b).
5' Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 719 (2d Cir. 1996). One plaintiff suffered from
thyroid cancer while the other two had AIDS.
o Quill, 870 F. Supp. at 80.
61 A notable exception is that their challenges were merely as-applied in nature,
rather than both as-applied and facial as had been the claims in Compassion.
Compare Quill, 80 F.3d at 719 with Compassion, 79 F.3d at 797.
61 Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78, 83-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). Under this
formulation, the Due Process Clause recognizes rights "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition." Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503
(1977).
63 Quill, 870 F. Supp. at 84.
64 Id. at 84-85.
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tradition.65 Turning to the Equal Protection challenge, he compared
New York's assisted suicide statutes to the State's policy on refusing
medical treatment.66 He found that because New York recognizes the
right to withdraw life support,67 it did not treat similarly-situated
persons alike: patients in the final stages of terminal illness who
happen to be on life-support systems may legally hasten their deaths
by refusing treatment, while other terminal patients are barred from
doing the same by self-administering prescribed drugs.
68
Judge Miner rejected the "natural versus unnatural death"
distinction, which the State invoked in the statutes' defense, on the
ground that withdrawal of treatment induced death not by the
underlying illness, but rather by starvation, dehydration, and/or
respiratory failure.69 Similarly, he rejected the "action-inaction
distinction" on the ground that a physician's complicity in removing
a respirator or other life-sustaining device involved significantly more
"action" than did writing a prescription, including physically
removing the equipment and administering palliative drugs which
themselves often contribute to the patient's death.7" Relying on
65 Quill, 80 F.3d at 724-25.
66 1d. at 727-29.
6 Id. at 727 (citing In re Eichner, 52 N.Y.2d 363 (1981) and In re Storar, 52
N.Y.2d 363 (1981)). See also N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2803-c (McKinney 1994),
which declares the right to refuse treatment as "the public policy of the state."
68 Quill, 80 F.3d at 729.
69 Id. Accord Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 822 n.91 (9th
Cir. 1996) (en banc) ("[I]t was the discontinuance of the provision of food and
water, not Cruzan's accident almost eight years earlier, that caused her death.").
71 Id. at 729. Judge Miner found support for his conclusion in Justice Scalia's
rejection of the action-inaction distinction in Cruzan: "Starving oneself to death is
no different from putting a gun to one's temple as far as the common-law definition
of suicide is concerned; the cause of death in both cases is the suicide's conscious
decision to 'pu[t] an end to his own existence."' Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't
of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 296-97 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal citation




Casey,7 1 Judge Miner queried:
[W]hat interest can the state possibly have in
requiring the prolongation of a life that is all but
ended? And what business is it of the state to require
the continuation of agony when the result is imminent
and inevitable? The greatly reduced interest of the
state in preserving life compels the answer to these
questions: "None."'
The Court held that the statutes served no rational relation to
legitimate purposes and hence violated the Equal Protection Clause.73
II. THE SUPREME COURT: MAJORITY DECISIONS
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to both cases to be heard
in tandem.74 Chief Justice Rehnquist, author of Cruzan and lead
dissenter in Casey, wrote the majority opinions in which Justices
Kennedy, Thomas, Scalia, and O'Connor joined.
A. Washington v. Glucksberg75
Chief Justice Rehnquist began his review of the Ninth Circuit's
ruling by noting that the American colonies adopted the common-law
condemnation of suicide and treated "counsel[ing] another to commit
71 Quill, 80 F.3d at 730 (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
72 Quill, 80 F.3d. at 729-30 (internal citations omitted).
SId. at 731.
I See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996); Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct.
37 (1996).
75 The non-profit organization Compassion in Dying was no longer a party to the
litigation because it failed to brief its claims in the trial court. Compassion in Dying
v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1467 (W.D. Wash. 1994); Brief for the
Petitioners, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (No. 96-110).
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suicide" as murder76 without exception for persons who were already
near death due to illness or scheduled execution.' In recent years, he
observed, the States' assisted suicide bans have generally been
reaffirmed by voters and legislatures;78 although legalization bills
have been introduced in several state legislatures (including those of
Washington and New York79), none have been enacted."
Chief Justice Rehnquist went on to describe the Court's
approach in analyzing Due Process challenges as involving two
primary features: an examination of the nation's history and tradition,
and a "careful description" of the asserted fundamental liberty
interest."t Under this inquiry, he rejected the level of abstraction with
which the Ninth Circuit had framed the issue. 2 He characterized it
instead as "whether the 'liberty' specially protected by the Due
Process Clause includes a right to commit suicide which itself
includes a right to assistance in doing so,"" citing a decision of the
76 Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. 2258,2264 (1997) (quoting 2 Z. SWIFT,
A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 270 (1823)).
' Id. at 2265 (citing Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146, 163 (1872), overruled
on other grounds, State v. Staten, 18 Ohio St. 2d 13 (1969); Commonwealth v.
Bowen, 13 Mass. 356, 360 (1816)).
78 Id. at 2265-67. He also mentioned the failed attempt to legalize the physician-
assisted suicide in Washington by initiative. See id. at 2266; see also supra note 10.
" See Wash. S.B. 5596, 54th Legis., Reg. Sess. (1995); N.Y.S.B. 1683, 218th
Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (1995); N.Y.A.B. 6333, 219th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg.
Sess. (1995); N.Y.S.B. 5024-A, 219th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (1995).
80 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2266.
91 Id. at 2268. This latter feature has never before been presented with such force.
The three cases Chief Justice Rehnquist cited for this newly-articulated requirement
involved the more familiar admonition against judicial "activism." See Reno v.
Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993); Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125
(1992); Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,277-78 (1990).
He employed this standard in Glucksberg in a much more literal sense by relying
upon it in defining the level of abstraction of the Court's inquiry, see Glucksberg,
117 S. Ct. at 2269, unlike any prior decision.
82 See text accompanying supra note 42.
83 Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2269 (1997). At oral argument,
Chief Justice Rehnquist had interrupted Kathryn Tucker during her introduction to
emphasize that the issue before the Court was not one of "choice," as she had
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Michigan Supreme Court upholding criminal charges against Jack
Kevorkian and framing its inquiry in virtually identical terms."l
The Chief Justice explained that the rights recognized in Cruzan
and Casey were based not on abstract notions of personal autonomy
but rather on analyses of their own historical precursors.15 Thus,
Cruzan merely respected the privilege against forced medical
treatment based on common-law battery, 6 while Casey's "intimate
and personal choices" passage was no more than a general description
of the familiar history-and-traditions standard. 7 Because physician-
assisted suicide "may be just as personal and profound as the decision
to refuse unwanted medical treatment, but... has never enjoyed
characterized it, but rather of assistance to suicide, because no state bars people
from committing suicide on their own. See Transcript of Oral Argument,
Washington v. Glucksberg, 1997 WL 13671, *27 (Jan. 8, 1997) (No. 96-110).
84 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2269 n.18. The Michigan Supreme Court had rejected
an inquiry similar to Judge Reinhardt's, preferring "whether the constitution
encompasses a right to commit suicide and, if so, whether it includes a right to
assistance." People v. Kevorkian, 447 Mich. 436,476 n.47 (1994). Compare id. at
517 (Levin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("By framing the question
in this manner, the lead opinion foreordains the answer.... The real issue is not
whether the state can generally prohibit suicide [but] whether the state may deny
a competent, terminally ill person, facing imminent, agonizing death, medical
assistance to commit suicide.").
8' Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2269-71.
86 Id. at 2270.
87 Id. at 2271. Reducing Casey's autonomy analysis to the familiar history-and-
tradition test significantly affects the relevance of the decision as it was understood
when issued and as it will no doubt be interpreted in the future. See, e.g., Ronald
Dworkin, The Center Holds, N.Y. REV. OF BooKs, Aug. 13, 1992, at 29 ("[Casey]
may prove to be one of the most important Court decisions of this generation...
because three key justices [O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter] ... reaffirmed a more
general view of the nature of the Constitution which they had been appointed to
help destroy"); Seeley v. Washington, 940 P.2d 604, 627 (Wash. 1997) (Sanders,
J., dissenting) ("Were we to restrict Roe and Casey to a specific narrow holding on
abortion we would rob these decisions of their claimed basis in the fundamental
principles inherent in substantive due process."). Justice O'Connor's concurrence
with the majority opinion in Glucksberg is telling of either her own interpretation
of Casey or her unwillingness to defend it.
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similar legal protection,"88 he concluded that rational basis scrutiny
was appropriate.89
Chief Justice Rehnquist disagreed with the contention that the
State's interest in life declines as the patient nears death, noting that
a State may decline to make judgments about the patient's "quality of
life."90 Because the legalization of physician-assisted suicide could
also make it more difficult for the State to identify patients whose
suicidal impulses were motivated by depression or mental illness, he
reasoned that a generalized ban on all assisted suicide is a rational
method of protecting them.9 He went on to recognize the State's
interests in protecting both the integrity of the medical profession92
and vulnerable groups such as individuals who are poor, elderly, or
have disabilities from resorting to suicide to spare their families the
financial costs of end-of-life care. 3 He identified the State's rational
" Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258,2270 (1997).
19 Id. at2271.
9 Id. at 2272 (citing Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,
282 (1990)).
9' Id. at 2273.
92 Id. at 2273-74 (citing AMERICAN MEDICAL AsSOCIATION, CODE OF ETHICS §
2.211 (1994)). Many commentators have argued that fostering an open, unfettered
physician-patient relationship in which the terminally ill may speak candidly with
their doctors about their available options, including physician-assisted suicide, is
crucial to the integrity and respectfulness the medical profession deserves. See, e.g.,
RUSSEL D. OGDEN, EUTHANASIA, ASSISTED SUICIDE, AND AIDS 190 (1994).
Accord AMA COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, CODE OF MEDICAL
ETHICS, Opinion 2.20, at 40 (1996) ("Physicians have an obligation to relieve pain
and suffering and to promote the dignity and autonomy of dying patients in their
care.").
9' Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258,2273 (1997). Perhaps tellingly, the
less affluent a person is, the less likely she is to favor the legalization of physician-
assisted suicide. See Mark Clements & Dianne Hales, How Healthy Are We?,
PARADE, Sept. 7, 1997, at 6 (finding legalization favored by 76% of survey
respondents earning $75,000 per year and over but only 59% earning under
$25,000 per year). The same survey reported that persons age 65 and over were
also less like to support legalization. Id. (53%, compared to 69% of those aged 18
to 34); see also Harold G. Koenig et al., Attitudes of Elderly Patients and Their
Families Toward Physician-Assisted Suicide, 156 ARCH. INT. MED. 2240-48 (1996)
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fear of the "slippery slope" and cited euthanasia in the Netherlands as
an example, arguing that legalization there had "not been limited to
competent, adults with terminally illness, who are enduring physical
suffering."94 Chief Justice Rehnquist ultimately rejected the plaintiffs'
challenges, finding it unnecessary to weigh the State's
"unquestionably important" interests to which the statute was "at least
reasonably related."
B. Vacco v. Quill
Turning to the Second Circuit's holding, Chief Justice
Rehnquist observed that neither New York's statutes banning assisted
suicide nor its statutes permitting refusal of medical treatment appear
on their faces to distinguish between persons: no one may assist
suicide, yet anyone may refuse treatment.96 Rejecting the disparity
that they purportedly created, he found the State's action-inaction
(elderly patients more likely than their families to oppose physician-assisted
suicide).
" Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2274. Of course, far from resulting from some
downward progression, the Dutch judiciary's tolerance of euthanasia had at no time
purported to be so limited. Euthanasia in the Netherlands is not a right of the
patient but rather a duty of the doctor, see supra note 38, and the Dutch courts have
never significantly expanded the rationale beyond its (admittedly broad) original
formulation. See, e.g., Doctor Given Suspended Sentence For Ending Life of Coma
Patient, ANP ENG. NEWS BULL., Oct. 26, 1995 (defense inapplicable to doctor who
failed to consult another physician and who received request only from the
patient's children); Dutch Doctor Fined For Breaching Euthanasia Rules, Reuters
World Service, May 11, 1995 (defense inapplicable to doctor who failed to consult
another physician and inaccurately reported cause of death); Dutch Nurse
Sentenced in Euthanasia Test Case, Reuters World Service, Mar. 23, 1995 (defense
inapplicable to nurse acting under physician's supervision).
95 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2275. The words he selected are significant because
they correlate with the terminology used in articulating the Court's "intermediate
scrutiny" standard, see, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994), suggesting
Chief Justice Rehnquist would have upheld the assisted suicide ban even under
heightened scrutiny.
96 Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293,2297-98 (1997).
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distinction "important and logical; it is certainly rational." 97 He
regarded this dichotomy as one of the law's long-recognized tools for
distinguishing between two actions which may have the same result,
citing dicta in Cruzan98 and even state statutes permitting one but not
the other (the validity of which the Court was, to some degree,
reviewing).99
Chief Justice Rehnquist found that the action-inaction
distinction applied to principles of both causation and intent. 0 First,
he believed, the withdrawal of life-sustaining medical treatment
results in death caused by the underlying illness whereas the ingestion
of physician-prescribed lethal medication itself causes the death.'0 '
Second, he remarked that a physician who agrees to withdraw a
patient's life-sustaining treatment may merely intend to "respect his
patient's wishes,"'1 2 whereas a physician who writes a lethal
prescription to assist a patient's suicide "must, necessarily and
9' Id. at 2298; see also id. at 2302 (describing the State's interests as "important");
id. at 2302 n.12 (referring to "the reasonableness of the distinction"). As had his
terminology in the Glucksberg Due Process analysis, Chief Justice Rehnquist's
choice of words suggests he would have found the State's interests sufficient to
satisfy even an intermediate scrutiny standard. See supra note 95. At oral argument
(but not in his brief) Laurence Tribe actually conceded that the action/inaction
distinction "isn't quite irrational" but rather that, in the context of physician-
assisted suicide, the distinction "operates irrationally." Transcript of Oral
Argument, Vacco v. Quill, 1997 WL 13672, *37 (Jan. 8, 1997) (No. 96-1858).
98 Quill, 117 S.Ct. at 2301 (citing Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health,
497 U.S. 261,280 (1990) (noting that "the majority of States in this country have
laws imposing criminal penalties on one who assists another to commit suicide.")).
9 Id. at 2299-2301 (citing N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2989(3) (McKinney 1994)
("This article is not intended to permit or promote suicide, assisted suicide, or
euthanasia.")).
'0o Id. at 2298.
101 Id. The opinion did not address Judge Miner's observation for the Second
Circuit that merely writing a prescription involves much less action than "pulling
the plug" which itself causes death by starvation, dehydration, and/or suffocation
rather than the patient's own illness. See supra text accompanying notes 69 and 70.
"~ Vacco v. Quill, 117 S.Ct. 2293, 2298 (1997).
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indubitably, intend primarily that the patient be made dead."' 3 He
also accepted the "double effect" rationale behind the legal practice
of aggressive pain treatment known as terminal sedation with the
"foreseen but unintended" consequence of hastened death."4
Likewise, the intent of the patient may differ as well-while suicide
is, by definition, motivated by the intent to kill one's self, a patient
who refuses life-sustaining treatment may wish to live but find the
necessary medical treatment repugnant. 05 Chief Justice Rehnquist
concluded that the same State interests discussed in the Glucksberg
opinion supported the validity of New York's ban.0 6
Ill. AN OPEN DOOR? THE CONCURRENCES
A. Footnotes Twenty-Four and Thirteen
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for five members of the Court
certainly appeared a decisive defeat for the challengers. Both the Due
Process and Equal Protection challenges were rejected unanimously,
and the precedential value of Cruzan and Casey was significantly
narrowed.0 7 Moreover, under a revamped formula for framing
103 Id. at 2299 (internal citation omitted). The Chief Justice's strong language on
this latter point would appear to ignore that the lead plaintiff in the case before him,
Dr. Timothy Quill, had written just such a prescription for one of his leukemia
patients sincerely hoping that she would not use it. See TIMOTHY E. QUILL, DEATH
AND DIGNITY: MAKING CHOICES AND TAKING CHARGE 12-15 (1993).
'04 Id. at2301-02.
105 Id at 2299. It should be noted that courts routinely uphold the right to withdraw
life-sustaining treatment in patients who wish to do so with the express purpose of
bringing about their deaths. See, e.g., DeGrella v. Elston, 858 S.W.2d 698 (Ky.
1993); Thor v. Superior Court of Solano, 5 Cal.4th 725 (1993); McKay v.
Bergstedt, 106 Nev. 808 (1990); State v. McAfee, 259 Ga. 579 (1989); Bouvia v.
Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127 (1986).
'06 Id. at 2302.
'07 See supra text accompanying notes 85-87. This result may have been
predictable, given the plaintiffs' dilemma in this litigation: legal precedents did
seem to support their argument (witness the language of Casey and the approach
of Cruzan), while a variety of highly-visible current events (such as the activities
1997-1998
. IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
judicial inquiry in Due Process cases,1° the Court implied that
assisted-suicide statutes would satisfy even heightened scrutiny09
Nevertheless, in two extrusive footnotes which may potentially incite
decades of new constitutional challenges, Chief Justice Rehnquist did
leave an apparently "open door."
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens had indicated that he
did not "foreclose the possibility that an individual plaintiff seeking
to hasten her death, or a doctor whose assistance was sought, could
prevail in a more particularized challenge."'"01 In footnote 24, casually
appended to the last paragraph of the Glucksberg majority opinion,
Chief Justice Rehnquist apparently agreed, citing Justice Stevens'
comments and stating, "[o]ur opinion does not absolutely foreclose
such a claim.""' He further qualified the reluctant concession:
"[hiowever, given our holding that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not provide heightened protection to the
asserted liberty interest in ending one's life with a physician's
assistance, such a claim would have to be quite different ftom the
ones advanced by respondents here.""' 2 A similar footnote appeared
at the end of the Quill majority opinion." 3 Footnote 13 described as
"true" Justice Stevens's observation that the Court's holding might
not apply to every possible application of the statute' " but again
explained that a future plaintiff challenging a state ban "in his
particular case would need to present different and considerably
stronger arguments" than did these plaintiffs."' Justice Stevens
of Jack Kevorkian and clashes over abortion rights) were certain to arouse the
Justices' anxieties.
... See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
'o See supra notes 95, 97 and accompanying text.
11 Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2302, 2309 (1997) (Stevens, J.
concurring in judgments).
"I Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2275 n.24 (1997).
112 Id.
113 Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2302 n.13 (1997).
114 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 23 10 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgments).
' Quill, 117 S .Ct. at 2302 n.13.
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implicitly acknowledged that a majority of the Court had adopted his
sentiments when he remarked that "[fluture cases will determine
whether such a challenge may succeed."
' 1 6
B. The Concurring Opinions
Four Justices agreed that the plaintiffs' facial and as-applied
constitutional challenges in both cases must fail, but for reasons
entirely separate from those set forth in the majority's opinions.17 In
addition, Justice O'Connor, the crucial fifth vote which Chief Justice
Rehnquist needed in order to avoid a fractured disposition,"8 joined
the majority's opinions but not without filing a concurrence." 9 Her
separate opinion necessarily affects the proper reading of the Court's
holdings.
20
116 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2309.
"1 Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2275-93 (Souter, J., concurring in
the judgment); Quill, 117 S. Ct. at 2302 (Souter J., concurring in judgments);
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2304-10 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgments); id at
23 10 (Ginsburg, J., concurring injudgments); id at 2310-12 (Breyer, J., concurring
in judgments). By "concurring in judgment," a Justice agrees with the majority
opinion's ultimate outcome but dissents from its legal rationale. Igor Kirman,
Standing Apart to be a Part: The Precedential Value ofSupreme Court Concurring
Opinions, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 2083,2089 (1995).
It' Chief Justice Rehnquist may have been concerned with the sheer number of
federal judges who had found a "right to die." As compared with the nine members
of his own court, 15 of 20 federal judges on six courts to have considered the issue
within three years identified some constitutionally-protected interest in physician-
assisted suicide. See supra discussion Parts L.A and I.B; Compassion in Dying v.
Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 850 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Beezer, J., dissenting);
Kevorkian v. Amett, 939 F. Supp. 725 (C.D.Cal. 1996). Footnotes 24 and 13 were
almost certainly designed to persuade his colleagues to form a unanimous reversal
of the lower decisions and a five-strong pronouncement of the justifications for the
assisted suicide ban.
"9 Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2302, 2303 (1997) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
120 For example, in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), Justice Powell
signed the five-member majority opinion but also wrote a short concurrence
invoking a more limited approach than the principal opinion. See id. at 709
1997-1998
IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
1. Justice Stevens' Opinion
Justice Stevens concurred in the majority's judgment but wrote
separately to emphasize that the Court's holdings left open the
possibility that the Constitution may place limits on States' power to
punish assisted suicide.' While he agreed with the majority's
conclusion that history and tradition provided a sufficient basis for
ruling against "an open ended right to commit suicide,"'2 he invoked
the Court's capital punishment jurisprudence as an example of the
possibility that statutes may be valid generally and yet
unconstitutional in certain applications.' Justice Stevens reasoned
that when a State has authorized the death penalty (such as
Washington or New York 24), it acknowledges that the sanctity of life
does not invariably require that life be preserved in all cases and thus
concedes the legitimacy of situations in which hastening death is
permissible.'25
(Powell, J., concurring). Most lower courts, noting that his vote was necessary for
a majority, have employed Justice Powell's approach in applying Branzburg. See,
e.g., Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 596 (1st Cir.
1980); Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 715-16 (3d Cir. 1979).
121 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2304 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgments).
122 Id. at 2305.
123 Id. at 2304 & n.4 (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (blocking
execution when jury had not been instructed that it could consider defendant's
mental retardation as a mitigating factor); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982)
(declaring unconstitutionally excessive execution of mere driver of get-away car);
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (forbidding execution under statute
which state courts had interpreted with capricious over-breadth to include the
defendant's crime)). Justice Stevens had joined the lead opinion in each of these
cases.
124 See N.Y. CoRREcT. LAW §§ 650-662 (McKinney 1994); WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 10.95.010-.900 (1996).
'2 Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. 2302, 2305 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgments). The Court has never explicitly described its capital
punishment jurisprudence in precisely these terms, but some Justices have arguably
gone even further by referring to a state's "interest" in executing certain criminals.
See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,425 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in
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Justice Stevens, who had dissented in Cruzan,126 disagreed that
the liberty interest in refusing medical treatment was based solely in
the common law. Instead, he believed that the right, like all others
protected by the Due Process Clause, derived from a more basic
concept of freedom older than the Constitution and even the common
law itself 2 7-- the fundamental right to make deeply personal
decisions.'28 That interest, he believed, was even stronger for the
patients bringing the Compassion and Quill lawsuits than for Nancy
Beth Cruzan because, unlike a vegetative patient, these plaintiffs
suffered severe and constant pain.129 Justice Stevens believed that
avoiding living out one's final days in excruciating pain and indignity
certainly fell within the "heart of liberty" recognized in the "personal
choices" passage from Casey.3 The State's interest in preserving life
does not have the same force in all cases, he explained, as this interest
is not a collective interest but rather an element of the individual's
liberty.' Although the State need not judge an individual's quality
part and concurring in judgment) ("in this case the State has a substantial and
legitimate interest in taking petitioner's life as punishment for his crime"); see also
Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 950 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in denial
of certiorari) (describing "the interest in imposing the death sentence" as "a state
interest").
126 See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 343 (1990)
(Stevens, J. dissenting) ("Choices about death touch the core of liberty.... Not
much may be said with confidence about death unless it is said from faith, and that
alone is reason enough to protect the freedom to conform choices about death to
individual conscience.").
127 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2306 & n.10. For more on Justice Stevens's dynamic
view of fundamental liberties, see John Paul Stevens, A Bicentennial Celebration
of the Constitution: The Third Circuit Judicial Conference in Philadelphia, 49 U.
PITr. L. REv. 723 (1988) and The Third Branch ofLiberty, 41 U. MIAMI L. REv.
277 (1986).
12 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2307 (citing Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 289 (1990) (O'Connor, J. concurring)).
129 Id.
30 Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
"3 Id. at 2307-08.
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of life, permitting the individual to do so herself properly recognizes
that liberty.
13 2
Justice Stevens pointed out that "the State's legitimate interest
in preventing abuse does not apply to an individual who is not
victimized by abuse, who is not suffering from depression, and who
makes a rational and voluntary decision to seek assistance in
dying."' 33 Likewise, it is generally undisputed that at least some pain
and suffering cannot be alleviated with any available palliative
treatment.'34 He also found the State's interest in the integrity of
medicine was not implicated in a situation in which a physician's
refusal to hasten the death of an individual patient might cause the
patient to feel abandoned in a time of need and might itself be
inconsistent with the healing role. 1
35
Justice Stevens also agreed with the majority on the Equal
Protection issue that the distinction between permitting death to result
from an underlying affliction and causing it to occur with a lethal
device constituted an adequately rational basis for addressing the
disparity the statutes at issue create. 36 Nevertheless, he reiterated that
132 Id. at 2308.
,33 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2308.
"' Id. (citing David Orentlicher, Legalization of Physician Assisted Suicide: A
Very Modest Revolution, 38 B.C.L. REv. 443,454 (1997) ("Greater use of palliative
care would reduce the demand for assisted suicide, but it will not eliminate the
demand.")); see also Robert J. Miller, Hospice Care as an Alternative to
Euthanasia, 20 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 127, 128 (1992); Kathleen M. Foley, The
Relationship of Pain and Symptom Management to Patient Requests for Physician-
Assisted Suicide, 6 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 289 (1991) (as much as 10% of
patient pain is untreatable).
"' Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2309 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring
in judgments).
136 Id. at 2309-10. Rather than relying on the common law as had the majority,
Justice Stevens cited the American Medical Association's support for patient rights
to withhold treatment but opposition to patient rights to assisted suicide. See Brief
of the American Medical Association, et al., Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997)
(No. 95-1858); Brief of the American Medical Association, et al., Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (No. 88-1503).
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in specific situations there may be no differences between the
intentions of the patients, physicians, or families involved and, in
such cases, the State's refusal to permit the patient to hasten her death
might impose an intolerable intrusion on her freedom.'37 The removal
of a life support system can occur with both the requesting patient's
and the complying physician's intent to hasten death; 38 similarly, a
physician prescribing lethal doses of medication may intend not to
induce death but only to ease the patient's suffering and obey her
wishes.
139
Justice Stevens also cited terminal sedation, which is both legal
and medically ethical, as further evidence of the "illusory character
of any differences in intent or causation" between practices which are
currently legal and physician-assisted suicide. 40 The purpose of
terminal sedation, he reasoned, is to honor the patient's wishes and
relieve her suffering, while the actual cause of death is the physician's
administration of massive doses of palliative medications.'4 1 A
physician's complicity in her patient's suicide may involve the
identical intent and causation.'42 Thus, he concluded, while mentally
competent adults with terminally illness do not have a right to
physician-assisted suicide as a class, such persons may enjoy that
right individually, depending upon their own circumstances.
43
13 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2309-10.
138 Id. at 2310. Justice Stevens remarked, "[a] doctor who fails to administer
medical treatment to one who is dying from a disease could be doing so with an
intent to harm or kill that patient."
"I Id He also suggested that physicians may intend only to provide their patients
with a sense of control over the dying process, given that many patients securing
lethal prescriptions do not ever take them. Id at 2310 n.15. Justice Stevens's
reasoning here is effective in drawing a line between physician-assisted suicide
and active euthanasia.
140 Id. at 2310.
141 Id.
142 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 23 10.
143 Id
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2. Justice Souter's Opinion
Justice Souter also concurred in the Court's judgments.' His
analysis differed from the majority's, however, in that he did not
believe that the challenged statutes amounted to the "arbitrary
impositions" or "purposeless restraints" of which the second Justice
Harlan spoke in his famous Poe v. Ufllman 45 dissenting opinion:
[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause cannot be found in or limited by the
precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere
provided in the Constitution. . . .It is a rational
continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a
freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and
purposeless restraints[.]
141
Although he believed that the individual interest "cannot be
gainsaid, 147 Justice Souter found that the States' slippery slope
concerns were sufficient to defeat the claim that the statutes banning
assisted suicide were arbitrary or purposeless.
148
'" Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258,2275 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring
in judgment); Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2302 (1997) (Souter, J. concurring
in judgment).
145 367 U.S. 497 (1961). Other cases in which Justice Souter's analysis has differed
from that of the majority by relying on Justice Harlan's Poe dissent include
Montana v. Egelhoff, 116 S. Ct. 2013, 2032 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting), and
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,286 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring). The plurality
opinion in Casey, of which Justice Souter was a joint author, also relied in part on
the Poe dissent. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 848-49 (1992).
11 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted). Justice Harlan was vindicated when the Court essentially adopted his
position four years later in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 478 (1965).
147 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2290.




3. Justice O'Connor's Opinion
Justice O'Connor, Chief Justice Rehnquist's pivotal fifth vote,
signed the majority opinion but also filed a brief concurrence. 149 She
joined the majority because she agreed that the Constitution
supported no generalized right to commit suicide.Y5 0 However, she
bifurcated the majority's statement of the issue 5' to emphasize that
there was no need to address the narrower question of a terminally ill
patient's "interest in controlling the circumstances of his of her
imminent death" because neither New York nor Washington
prohibited methods of pain treatment up to and including medicating
the patient into unconsciousness.' She identified the States' interests
"'s Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2303 (1997) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
150 Id.
"' The majority had framed the issue as "whether the 'liberty' specially protected
by the Due Process Clause includes a right to commit suicide which itself includes
a right to assistance in doing so." See id at 2269.
"I Id at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring). If Justice O'Connor's reasoning implies
that terminal sedation relieves all physical pain for all patients, it is apparently
mistaken. See Howard Brody, Assisted Death: A Compassionate Response to a
Medical Failure, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1384, 1385 (1992) ("In a small percentage
of cases palliative efforts will fail."); Larry Beresford, Hospice and the End ofLife
Debate, 9 CAL. HOSPICE REP. 8 (1991) ("Everybody who has worked in hospice
for very long knows a handful of cases where the patient's suffering was simply
untreatable."); see also supra note 134.
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as including the difficulty in defining terminal illness'53 and
protecting patients whose suicide assistance might not have been
requested competently or voluntarily.'54
4. Justice Ginsburg's Opinion
Justice Ginsburg wrote, without elaboration, that she concurred
in the judgments "substantially for the reasons stated by Justice
O'Connor."'55 Justice Ginsburg's questions and comments during oral
argument, however, confirn that she shared Justice O'Connor's two
primary concerns: that the Court ought not interfere at this time, 156 but
that it should also remain vigilant as to the physical pain of
individuals with terminal illnesses. 1
57
'3 If terminal illness is difficult to define, that has not deterred lawmakers from
attempting to do so. The phrase "terminal illness" is defined by statute in virtually
every state, usually as a condition expected to produce death within six months, see
infra note 185, and legislatures have imposed on doctors the duty to assess terminal
illness in a variety of contexts, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395f (a)(7)(A) (1994)
(eligibility for certain Medicare programs); ALASKA STAT. § 21.55.110 (7) (Michie
1996) (eligibility for certain state health insurance benefits). The medical
profession itself uses the terminal diagnosis as a clinical "bright line" prerequisite
for eligibility for certain treatments, including terminal sedation. Paul Rousseau,
Terminal Sedation in the Care of Dying Patients, 156 ARcH. INT. MED. 1785, 1785
(1996).
"u Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2303 (1997) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
155 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2310 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgments).
156 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, Washington v. Glucksberg, 1997 WL
13671, *30 (Jan. 8, 1997) (No. 96-110) ("everything that you said, it seems to me,
could go on in a legislative chamber"); id. at *30-31 (expressing slippery slope
concerns under "a grand due process clause").
"' See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, Vacco v. Quill, 1997 WL 13672, *5-6,
*7, *8-9 (Jan. 8, 1997) (No. 96-1858) (asking about the "gray area" of terminal
sedation); id. at *20 (asking about risks that doctors will be "fearful of putting
people out of pain because they don't know whether that's going to constitute
physician-assisted suicide or accepted relief of pain").
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5. Justice Breyer's Opinion
Justice Breyer concurred in the judgments and also in Justice
O'Connor's opinion "except insofar as it joins the majority."' S He
agreed with the majority that the States' interests were sufficient to
justify the distinction between removal of life support and physician-
assisted suicide. 59 However, he was apparently the only member of
the Court to frame the issue as whether the Constitution protected an
individual's personal control over the manner of her death and
avoidance of severe physical suffering. 6 He was satisfied with the
statutes' validity because both New York and Washington allowed as
much medication as a patient needed to alleviate pain.16 1 Justice
Breyer concluded that legal circumstances would be different if, for
example, state laws prohibited both assisted suicide and the provision
of adequate end-of-life pain management.
62
"' Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2310 (1997) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in judgments).
119 Id. at 23 11.
" Id. He relied partly on Justice Harlan's Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961)
dissent (and acknowledged Justice Souter's concurrence) for this approach.
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2311.
16) Id Although he recognized that some patients do not receive adequate palliative
care, he found this to be so for "institutional" reasons rather than due to
unnecessarily prohibitive state laws. Id. at 2312.
162 Id Most of the questions Justice Breyer asked at oral argument dealt with the
large percentages of patients who die in pain despite that effective palliative
treatment is theoretically available. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument,
Washington v. Glucksberg, 1997 WL 13671, *25-26, *26-28 (Jan. 8, 1997) (No.
96-110). He also asked Laurence Tribe whether any Supreme Court decisions
supported "a personal right against enduring pain and suffering." See Transcript of
Oral Argument, Vacco v. Quill, 1997 WL 13672, *57 (Jan. 8, 1997) (No. 96-1858);
see also infra note 181.
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IV. POST-GLUCKSBERG CHALLENGES TO ASSISTED SUICIDE
LAWS
All nine members of the Supreme Court agreed on a small
number of points. First, all agreed that the class of mentally
competent, terminally ill adults does not collectively enjoy a federal
constitutional right to a lethal dose of physician-prescribed
medication for the purpose of committing suicide. 6 Second, they all
believed that the physician-assisted suicide question is essentially a
legislative issue.'" Third, and most importantly, apparently all nine
members agreed that a narrower, more particularized constitutional
challenge to the as-applied validity of a statute forbidding assisted
suicide might possibly succeed.'"5 Because each Justice had purported
163 Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2275 (1997) (statute "does not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment, either on its face or as applied to competent,
terminally ill adults") (internal quotation marks omitted); id. at 2275 (Souter, J.,
concurring in judgment) ("the statute's application to the doctors has not been
shown to be unconstitutional"); id. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (joined by
Breyer and Ginsburg, JJ.) ("the State's interests ... are sufficiently weighty to
justify a prohibition against physician-assisted suicide"); id. at 2305 (Stevens, J.,
concurring injudgments) ("the 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause does
not include a categorical right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to
assistance in doing so") (internal quotation marks omitted).
"6 Id. at 2268 (expressing reluctance to "place the matter outside the arena of
public debate and legislative action"); id. at 2293 (Souter, J., concurring in
judgment) ("I acknowledge the legislative institutional competence as the better
one to deal with [the] claim at this time"); id at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(joined by Breyer and Ginsburg, JJ.) ("There is no reason to think the democratic
process will not strike the proper balance. . . "); Transcript of Oral Argument,
Washington v. Glucksberg, 1997 WL 13671, *12 (Jan. 8, 1997) (No. 96-110)
(Justice Stevens stating, "one of the most powerful arguments in support of [the
States'] position in this case is legislatures might adopt the remedy rather than the
courts").
165 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2309 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgments) ("I do
not, however, foreclose the possibility that an individual plaintiff.., could prevail
in a more particularized challenge"); id. at 2275 n.24 ("Our opinion does not
absolutely foreclose [Justice Stevens's conclusion]") (internal quotation marks
omitted); id at 2290 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment) ("Whether that interest
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not to reach the issue of the circumstances under which such a
challenge might prevail, this loophole is really more accurately
described as a potential loophole. The "door" seems to be not
necessarily "open," but quite unarguably "unlocked."
Two primary, related inquiries therefore remain for the lower
courts. First, what is the precise scope of the as-applied challenge
which the Court might tolerate? Second, what are the essential
characteristics of the plaintiff who could bring such a claim? The
majority opinions create this "door" in Footnotes 24 and 13 by
explicitly incorporating Justice Stevens' analysis and his
interpretation of Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinions, which left hints
as to how a court might conduct these two inquiries. In addition,
Justice O'Connor's concurrence suggested an approach more flexible
than that of the majority and qualified her vote with them. 6' The
concurrences of Justices Stevens and O'Connor, therefore, appear to
delineate the outer limits of any "open door."'
67
might in some circumstances, or at some time, be seen as 'fundamental' to the
degree entitled to prevail is not, however, a conclusion that I need draw here"); id.
at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (joined by Ginsburg, J.) ("[T]here is no need
to address the question whether suffering patients have a constitutionally
cognizable interest in obtaining relief from the suffering that they may
experience"); id. at 2312 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgments) ("Were the legal
circumstances different... the Court might have to revisit its conclusions in these
cases.").
166 See supra note 120.
67 Because Justices Breyer and Ginsburg joined the core of Justice O'Connor's
opinion, the only unrepresented member of the Court in these considerations is
Justice Souter. No member of the Court joined his opinion, and the majority
criticized him for "abandon[ing]" the "retrained methodology" of its own history-
and-traditions standard. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2268
(1997). Of course, his vote remains relevant to future constitutional challenges
given his willingness to revisit his conclusions. See id. at 2290 (Souter, J.,
concurring in judgment).
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A. The Scope of an Adequately Framed As-Applied Challenge
As-applied challenges can vary in scope tremendously.
Compare, for instance, Wisconsin v. Yoder,6 ' upholding a mandatory
school attendance law but excusing the entire Amish community from
its reach, with Cox v. Louisiana,69 upholding a picket-zone statute
but declaring unconstitutional one demonstrator's conviction after a
police officer mistakenly told him he was demonstrating far enough
away. Although the capital punishment as-applied exceptions Justice
Stevens cited in his Glucksberg concurrence are rather broad,' his
analysis was actually much narrower than Justice O'Connor's. In fact,
they each appear to predicate their analyses on opposite ends of the
as-applied spectrum.
On the one hand, Justice O'Connor referred to the broad as-
applied challenge on which the plaintiffs had originally sought a
decision-whether the entire class of mentally competent adults with
terminally illnesses enjoy a right to physician-prescribed medication
in committing suicide-as the reason for her separate opinion and as
unnecessary for the Court's disposition of the cases.' 7 ' On the other
hand, Justice Stevens agreed with the majority that this broad as-
applied challenge must fail, and instead argued that a particular
patient's interests might outweigh those of the State in the patient's
own case-specific circumstances. 72
Justice Stevens has espoused such a case-by-case approach in
168 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
169 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
170 See supra note 123.
171 Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. 2302,2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
17 See id at 2309 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgments). The fact that the by-then
deceased plaintiffs' prayers for relief did not expressly refer to their own
individualized cases but rather sought the broader declaration to which Justice
O'Connor referred, see Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 719 (2d Cir. 1996);
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 797 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc)




the past. For example, in In re Michael H. v. Gerard D.,173 the Court
upheld the validity of a statutory presumption that the child of a
married woman was her husband's, even when all parties conceded
that the child was actually the product of the woman's extra-marital
affair. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment on the ground that
the biological father had had a statutory opportunity to demonstrate
to the trial court that, notwithstanding the presumption, allowing him
visitation was in the child's best interests. Although the father in that
case had failed to meet that standard, Justice Stevens agreed that the
statutory presumption did not violate the father's constitutional rights
because this opportunity was available. 74
Justice Stevens apparently envisioned a similar scenario for the
practice of physician-assisted suicide, in which a terminally ill person
in severe pain may petition a court for judicial assessment of her
eligibility for a physician's lethal prescription. 75 If this interpretation
of Justice Stevens's opinion is correct, the majority adopted it in
Footnotes 24 and 13 by agreeing that individual plaintiffs might
prevail in their own particular claims and citing (only) to Justice
Stevens's formulation. 76 Justice O'Connor's opinion, which
distinguished the plaintiffs' broad-based challenge from the extent of
the Court's decision, does not seem to be inconsistent with this case-
by-case approach for two reasons. First, Justice O'Connor
3 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
I d. at 133-34. See also Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) and
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 922 n.8
(1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), in which Justice
Stevens approved of laws requiring parental notification before a minor may obtain
an abortion, relying on the availability of a "judicial bypass" mechanism through
which a minor may procure an abortion without parental notification by petitioning
a court to assess her competency and best interests.
"' The clearly prospective phrasing throughout his opinion implied more than a
mere defense to criminal prosecution or jury power of acquittal after the fact of
physician assistance. The majority employed similar terminology in adopting
Justice Stevens's analysis. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2275
n.24 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293,2302 n.13 (1997).
176 See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2275 n.24; Quill, 117 S. Ct. at 2302 n.13.
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presumably agreed with Footnotes 24 and 13 in that she signed the
majority opinion and that its other four adherents almost certainly
included these concessions specifically to secure her signature.'77
Second, if the class of mentally competent adults with terminal
illnesses do enjoy the right of which Justice O'Connor purports not
to reach consideration, individual members of that class would seem
to enjoy the same right.
Justice O'Connor's own conception of the legal circumstances
in which the broad-based challenge would succeed, however, is
significantly less likely to bear fruit. First, at most three (and more
likely two) other members of the Court shared her views. Only
Justices Breyer and Ginsburg commented on her concurrence, 78 and
Justice Souter's analysis was at best merely compatible with it.
179
Second, and more importantly, the legal environment which Justice
O'Connor considers a prerequisite for the success of the plaintiffs'
challenge does not exist and is extremely unlikely to ever develop.
Like Justice Breyer, she considered the plaintiffs' constitutional
concerns to be adequately addressed by the theoretical availability in
New York and Washington of palliative technology capable of
eliminating virtually all pain, even if at the risk of expedited death.'80
However, neither aggressive pain therapy nor terminal sedation
'7 See supra note 118. Even if Justice O'Connor did disagree, Justice Stevens
would provide the fifth vote for his own formulation.
178 Both joined her opinion with minor qualification to indicate their departure
from the majority's formulation. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2302,
2310 (1997) (Ginsburg, J., concurring injudgments); id. (Breyer, J., concurring in
judgments).
179 See supra discussion Part III.B.2. Justice Souter mentioned that a challenge to
the validity of the ban might deserve to prevail "in some circumstances, or at some
time," but did not elaborate. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2290 (Souter, J.,
concurring in judgment). Justice O'Connor, meanwhile, found the question
unnecessary to resolve given that state laws currently pose no obstacle to palliative
care for the dying. See id. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
S0 See supra discussion Part III.B.3.
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appear to be illegal anywhere in the country." 1 Fueled in part by the
recent controversy over physician-assisted suicide, several states in
the last few years have in fact stepped up efforts to improve palliative
care for the dying. 2 Neither has the Supreme Court ever recognized
a general constitutional right to be free from physical pain not
inflicted by the State itself."3 A district court, therefore, would be
hard-pressed to find a constitutional right to physician-assisted
suicide under any potential loophole Justice O'Connor's concurrence
1"1 See YALE KAMISAR, Physician-Assisted Suicide: the Last Bridge to Active
Voluntary Euthanasia, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL AND LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 240 (John Keown ed., 1995) ("[T]he law . . . recognizes the
principal of the 'double effect'. . . by exempting 'prescribing, dispensing or
administering' medication or treatment designed 'to relieve pain or discomfort and
not to cause death, even if the medication or procedure may hasten or increase the
risk of death."'). Some states have codified their approval of terminal sedation. See,
e.g., LA. REV.STAT.ANN. § 14:32.12 (C)(2) (West 1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
22-16-37.1 (Michie 1997).
82 More than a dozen states have passed legislation in the last five years designed
to improve pain management for the terminally and chronically ill. See, e.g.,
"Intractable Pain Treatment Act," Mo. REV. STAT. § 334.105, et seq. (West 1979
& Supp.1997) (easing restrictions on use of medications); NEV. REV. STAT. §§
630.020, 630.3066, 633.521 (1995) (same); OR. REV. STAT. § 677.470, et seq.
(1990 and Supp. 1997) (same); see also TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 61.785, TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 102.009 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997) (improving pain
management education for physicians); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.16204 (1996)
(MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.15 (Callaghan 1996)) (same).
183 A prisoner enjoys rights to freedom from physical pain inflicted by the State in
certain circumstances. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1992); Ingraham
v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977). This right is also implicated when the State
demonstrates deliberate indifference to a prisoner's own physical pain. Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). However, the Court has distinguished these
cases from situations in which a state child protection agency failed to protect a
child from his father's physical abuse, reasoning that the State assumes a duty to
protect a prisoner by taking him into involuntary custody. See DeShaney v.
Winnebago Cty. Dep't of Social Services., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). But see Taylor v.
Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 794 (1 1th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (ruling that abused child
enjoyed "the right to be free from the infliction of unnecessary pain" when
involuntarily placed in foster care), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989).
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might establish. If an open door exists, it belongs to Justice Stevens.
B. Profiling the Post-Glucksberg Plaintiff
Justice Stevens's concurrence also illustrates what a potential
plaintiff in a particularized challenge might look like, under both Due
Process and Equal Protection theories. His opinion does so by
explaining the circumstances under which the interests of a patient
making a decision to seek suicide assistance might override in her
own individual case the State's legitimate justification for a blanket
ban. 84 Once again, the patient would apparently petition a court and
request an assessment of her personal situation. If the court agreed
that the State's interests did not apply to the plaintiff, presumably the
court would be empowered under Glucksberg and Quill to declare the
state's law barring physician-assisted suicide unconstitutional as
applied to her and issue an order barring its enforcement against the
patient's assisting physician.' 5
With respect to such a claim predicated on a Due Process
theory, Justice Stevens cited Cruzan for the proposition that "some
individuals who no longer have the option of deciding whether to live
or to die because they are already on the threshold of death have a
constitutionally protected interest that may outweigh the State's
interest in preserving life at all costs."' 6 Although he did not define
the expression "threshold of death," he made clear that only persons
with a terminal diagnosis would be capable of demonstrating
sufficient interests in a physician's lethal prescription to override the
'8 See supra text accompanying notes 133-35, 138-42.
,s The action would most likely be predicated on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), as
were the original complaints in Glucksberg and Quill. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d
716, 718 (2d Cir. 1996); Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 589
(9th Cir. 1995).




law.187 Justice Stevens went on to characterize the interest of the
State in preventing suicide induced by depression or third-party
coercion as "compelling" but found that this interest cannot attach
when the patient is not in fact depressed or being coerced.,88 His
conclusion, therefore, is virtually identical to the claims the
Glucksberg and Quill plaintiffs had originally made: that a mentally
competent, terminally ill adult making a voluntary request for a lethal
prescription from her doctor enjoys a constitutional right to be free
from the State's interference." 9 The difference is that Justice Stevens
would permit a State to prohibit suicide assistance generally, leaving
such rare cases to be judicially exempted, rather than (as the
challenging litigants had sought) striking down the prohibitions
altogether and leaving to State regulation the effort to exclude those
ineligible. 90
A claim based on an Equal Protection theory would be more
complicated. In addition to demonstrating to a court that none of the
State's interests implicated in a Due Process challenge applied,'91 a
187 There is general consensus as to the legal definition of "terminal illness."
Nearly every state statutorily defines the term as a condition which a physician has
diagnosed as likely to produce death within six months. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 1250 (h)(i)(2)(B) (1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-553 (a)(6)
(1996); MINN. STAT. § 62A.616 (1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-201 (4) (1996);
VA. CODEANN. § 32.1-162.1 (1997); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(dd)(3)(A) (1996).
188 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2308.
89 See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 719 (2d Cir. 1996) (plaintiffs seeking
enjoinment of statutes "as applied to physicians who assist mentally competent,
terminally ill adults who choose to hasten inevitable death").
190 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2305. The circuit courts which had struck down the
Washington and New York statutes had stated that legislative regulation of
physician-assisted suicide was constitutionally permissible, and even offered
suggestions for doing so. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 730-31 & n.4 (2d Cir.
1996); Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 832-33 (9th Cir. 1996).
'9 See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2295 (1997) ("New York's reasons for
recognizing and acting on [the action-inaction] distinction ... are discussed in
greater detail in our opinion in Glucksberg[.]"). Justice Souter described the Equal
Protection Clause as "doling] essentially nothing in a case like this that the Due
Process Clause cannot do on its own." Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258,
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petitioning patient would also need to show that the action-inaction
distinction did not apply in her own particular case. First, she would
need to demonstrate that either terminal sedation or refusal of
treatment is legal in her state. 92 This ought not be difficult because
both are apparently legal everywhere in the nation. 9 Second, she
would need to demonstrate that her primary intention was merely to
relieve her suffering despite her knowledge that her own death would
be an additional consequence. 94 Finally, she would need to establish
that her physician was willing to give her a lethal prescription with
the intention not of inducing her death but of merely obeying her
wishes or giving her a sense of control over the dying process. 95
2277 n.3 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring in judgment).
192 Justice Stevens considered these options as equivalents for purposes of this
constitutional inquiry. See id. at 2309-10 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgments).
Note that Justices O'Connor and Ginsburg disagreed with Justice Stevens's
assessment of the relevance of terminal sedation: Justice Stevens suggested that he
might permit suicide assistance should terminal sedation be the patient's only other
option (just as if that option were continued pain), see id. at 2307-08, while Justices
O'Connor and Ginsburg found the availability of terminal sedation as itself the
justification for banning assisted suicide as a method for relieving suffering, see id.
at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring), 2311-12 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgments).
193 See supra note 179.
194 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2310 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgments) ("There
may be little distinction between the intent of a terminally-ill patient who decides
to remove her life-support and one who seeks the assistance of a doctor in ending
her life; in both situations, the patient is seeking to hasten a certain, impending
death."); id. ("The purpose of terminal sedation is to ease the suffering of the
patient and comply with her wishes, and the actual cause of death is the
administration of heavy doses of lethal sedatives. This same intent and causation
may exist [in physician-assisted suicide].").
,95 See id. ("The doctor's intent might also be the same in prescribing lethal
medication as it is in terminating life support.... [A] doctor who prescribes lethal
medication does not necessarily intend the patient's death-rather that doctor may
seek simply to ease the patient's suffering and to comply with her wishes."); id at
2310 n. 15 ("[lit's not at all clear that the physician's intent is that the patient be
made dead[.]. Many patients prescribed lethal medications never actually take
them; they merely acquire some sense of control in the process of dying that the
availability of those medications provides.") (citation and internal quotation marks
VOL. XVI
The Open Door
Perhaps the greatest obstacle to an individual Equal Protection claim,
however, would be that two Justices beyond the majority flatly
rejected it: Justice Breyer agreed with the Court's articulation of the
action-inaction distinction in its entirety, 96 and Justice Souter argued
that a physician writing a lethal prescription was necessarily doing so
"to serve an affirmative intent to die" even if the patient's death was
not the physician's direct purpose.197 For all of these reasons, the
petitioning patient would probably opt to predicate her individual
challenge on the Due Process Clause rather than a more cumbersome
and less promising Equal Protection theory.
Presumably, the patient would prove her Due Process case with
affidavit and/or live testimony. The patient's physician would need
to attest to the patient's terminal diagnosis' and satisfactory mental
condition. 99 The patient would herself need to testify that she
experienced intolerable physical pain which other techniques had
failed to alleviate;"' that her relationship with her physician would
omitted).
I d. at 2311 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgments).
I ld at 2291 n.16 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment); see also id, at 2277 n.3.
198 See id at 2307 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgments) ("individuals who... are
already on the threshold of death have a constitutionally protected interest"); id. at
2311 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgments) ("[T]he avoidance of severe physical
pain (connected with death) would have to comprise an essential part of any
successful claim") (emphasis added); id at 2290 (Souter, J., concurring in
judgment) ("There can be no stronger claim to a physician's assistance than at the
time when death is imminent.").
99 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2308 (Stevens, J., concurring
in judgments) ("[T]he State has a compelling interest in preventing persons from
committing suicide because of depression .... But [this interest] does not apply to
an individual... who is not suffering from depression"); compare Thor v. Superior
Court, 855 P.2d. 375 (Cal. 1993) (depressed patient competent to decide to forgo
life-sustaining treatment). This prerequisite would probably also include an
assurance that the patient's illness had not itself impaired any cognitive
functioning.
21 Id. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (joined by Ginsburg, J.) ("[State interests
prevail because] a patient.., who is experiencing great pain has no legal barriers
to obtaining medication, from qualified physicians, to alleviate that suffering"); id.
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not suffer from her physician's complicity in her suicide;2 1 and that
she had reached her decision voluntarily2 2 and free of influence from
either the financial cost of continued treatment2 3 or pressure from
at 2307 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgments) ("Avoiding intolerable pain and the
indignity of living one's final days incapacitated and in agony is [protected]"); id.
at 2311 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgments) ("[T]he avoidance of severe physical
pain (connected with death) would have to comprise an essential part of any
successful claim"). Note that an attestation to the ineffectiveness of pain relief
techniques may not be sufficient for Justices Ginsburg and O'Connor, who had
emphasized that a right to assisted suicide would be implicated (if at all) only if
barriers to pain relief were legally imposed rather than attributable to "institutional
reasons or inadequacies or obstacles." Id. at 2312; accord id. at 2303 (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
20l While this would seem self-evident in the case of any patient seeking her
physician's assistance in suicide, the Glucksberg majority made clear that the
State's interest in maintaining the integrity of the practice of medicine extended
beyond the medical profession generally and reached individual physician-patient
relationships. See id. at 2273 ("The patient's trust in the doctor's whole-hearted
devotion to his best interests will be hard to sustain [if assisted suicide is
legalized]") (internal quotation marks omitted). An individual patient would thus
need to explicitly distinguish that scenario from her own case. See id. at 2308
(Stevens, J., concurring in judgments) ("[Flor some patients, it would be a
physician's refusal to dispense medication to ease their suffering and make their
death tolerable and dignified that would be inconsistent with the [physician's]
healing role.").
202 Id at 2308 ("[Tlhe State's legitimate interest in preventing abuse does not apply
to an individual... who makes a rational and voluntary decision to seek assistance
in dying.").
203 See id at 2273 ("If physician-assisted suicide were permitted, many might




any other person. 4 If the State did not dispute these factual
allegations,205 the burden would apparently shift to the State to prove
as a matter of law why the plaintiff should not be entitled to her
requested relief,"6 an injunction against State interference with or
prosecution for her doctor's complicity in her suicide. Nevertheless,
if any State interests exist which would be adequate to meet this
burden, no member of the Supreme Court offered guidance as to how
to identify or present them.
The next few years will reveal whether terminally ill patients
will indeed seek to petition courts for judicial "permission" to receive
physician assistance in suicide under the authority of Footnotes 24
and 13, and how the courts will handle such petitions. If the courts do
come to grant these petitions with any degree of frequency, then the
Supreme Court may ironically have birthed a system of judicial
oversight of dignified death. 7 despite the specific intentions of some
4 It may be that this attestation should be made under the terminology of state
common-law or statutory definitions of undue influence. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith,
482 So.2d 1161, 1163 (Ala. 1985) (setting forth state common law definition of
undue influence); Ward v. Ward, 215 N.W.2d 3,5-6 (1997) (same). The testimony
might also need to include the patient's assurance that she had felt neither
victimized nor influenced by any negative attitudes or stereotypes. See Glucksberg,
117 S. Ct. at 2273-74 (State's interest in preventing abuse extends to protecting the
terminally ill from such prejudices).
25' Although neither Washington nor New York challenged any of the plaintiffs'
factual assertions as to their mental and physical conditions in Compassion or
Quill, a state's attorney general might opt to do so in a more particularized
challenge. The State might, for example, require the patient to submit to physical
and psychological examination by its own doctors. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 35.
20 Once a challenger meets her burden of production so as to demonstrate a prima
facie case of governmental action in conflict with the Constitution, the burden
shifts to the government to justify the infringement. That burden requires a
showing of both (1) the legitimacy and strength of the governmental interest, and
(2) the factual nexus between the governmental interest and the action taken to
achieve that interest. David L. Faigman, Measuring Constitutionality
Transactionally, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 761-62 (1994).
207 Cf Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 755-59 (1977), in which the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts assumed and delineated the state
judiciary's supervisory role over decisions to either direct or enjoin medical
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of its members.2°8 Rather than placing the judicial branch at the core
of defining the parameters of a newly-recognized right (as it had in
1973 with Roe v. Wade), the Supreme Court may have instead planted
the seed for ajudicial screening process for assisted suicide in which
terminally ill "applicants" plead their cases to judges who may or
may not grant their requests for lethal medications.0 9 Surprisingly
enough, such a system would not be unprecedented: in ancient
Greece, citizens could obtain hemlock from local magistrates and
commit suicide after stating their reasons to, and receiving permission
treatment in incompetent persons, stating:
We do not view the judicial resolution of this most difficult and
awesome question-whether potentially life-prolonging
treatment should be withheld from a person incapable of making
his own decision-as constituting a "gratuitous encroachment"
on the domain of medical expertise. Rather, such questions of
life and death seem to us to require the process of detached but
passionate investigation and decision that forms the ideal on
which thejudicial branch of government was created. Achieving
this ideal is our responsibility and that of the lower court, and is
not to be entrusted to any other group purporting to represent the
"morality and conscience of our society," no matter how highly
motivated or impressively constituted.
Id. at 759.
208 At oral argument, Chief Justice Rehnquist repeatedly expressed concern that
recognition of any "right to die" would foment a flood of constitutional litigation.
He predicted that "the next couple of generations are going to have to deal with"
issues regarding the validity of state regulation of physician-assisted suicide--"the
same thing I suspect that perhaps has happened with the abortion cases." Transcript
of Oral Argument, Washington v. Glucksberg, No. 96-110, 1997 WL 13671, *38-
39 (Jan. 8, 1997). Justice O'Connor agreed, predicting "if we upheld [plaintiffs']
position, it would result in a flow of cases through the court system for heaven
knows how long." Id at *39. See also id at *23 (Justice Ginsburg asking, "[ils this
ever a proper question for courts as opposed to legislatures to decide?").
209 See People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 747 (1994) (Levin, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("I would hold that a terminally ill person may apply
to the [trial] court for an order declaring entitlement to seek medical assistance, and
that [the statute prohibiting suicide assistance] is violative of the Due Process
Clause as applied to that person.").
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from, the Senate."' These laws were intended to prevent impulsive
self-destruction and to enable rapid, painless suicide when
reasonable. 211 A modem-day analogue may be the "judicial bypass"
mechanism by which many States regulate abortions in minors.21 2
Under these systems, which have the Supreme Court's blessing,23 an
unemancipated young woman may procure an abortion against her
parent's wishes only if she first petitions a court which determines
that she is giving her informed consent and/or that the abortion is in
her best interests. If lower courts recognize and develop a comparable
case-by-case system for physician-assisted suicide, it might feasibly
permit some terminally ill patients to obtain the dignified death they
seek while effectively preventing the abuses and "slippery slope"
dangers which had so troubled the Justices.
C. The First Test Case? Mclver v. Krischer
There has yet been only one instance in which a court has faced
the validity of a physician-assisted suicide prohibition since the
Glucksberg and Quill rulings. In 1996, three terminally ill patients
filed suit in a Florida state court seeking a declaration that a named
physician, Dr. Cecil Mclver, could not be prosecuted or
professionally disciplined in the event that he assisted their suicides
210 Alfred Alvarez, The Background, in SUICIDE: THE PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES 18
(M. Pabst Battin & David J. Mayo eds., 1980); EMILE DURKHEIM, SUICIDE: A
STUDY IN SOCIOLOGY 330 (John A. Spaulding & George Simpson trans., Free Press
1951).
2" George Howe Colt, The Enigma of Suicide 147 (1991). Depending on the
region of Greece, acceptable reasons included old age, sickness, and misfortune.
1d.; see also DURKHEIM, supra note 208, at 330.
212 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-21-3 (1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 311.732 (1995);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.028 (1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.7-6 (Supp. 1996); W.
VA. CODE § 16-2F-3 (1995).
2"3 See Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462
U.S. 476,490-93 (1993); Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 497
U.S. 502 (1990); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899-900 (1992).
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by providing them with lethal prescriptions.2 '1 4 Unlike all prior
assisted-suicide cases (including the Compassion and Quill lawsuits),
in this suit the plaintiffs sought to enjoin enforcement of the state
statute2 15 against a particular doctor only, and in favor of particular
terminally ill patients.216 Two of these patients died before trial,
leaving the request of AIDS patient Charles E. Hall the only non-
moot portion of the litigation.217 In an unpublished decision, the trial
court made the following factual findings:
(1) Mr. Hall was terminally ill;
(2) Mr. Hall was alert and intelligent, and he exhibited a clear
understanding of his medical condition and its consequences;
(3) a psychiatrist had evaluated Mr. Hall and determined that he
was mentally competent;
(4) Mr. Hall wished to live but sought merely to end his suffering
by self-administering a lethal dose of medication that Dr. Melver
would prescribe to him;
(5) Mr. Hall's judgment was unaffected by any undue influence or
mental illness;
(6) a physician like Dr. Mclver would be sufficiently skilled to
214 See Mclver v. Krischer, No. CL-96-1504-AF, 1997 WL 225878 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
Jan 31, 1997).
215 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.08 (West 1992) states: "Every person deliberately
assisting another in the commission of self-murder shall be guilty of manslaughter,
a felony of the second degree[.]"
216 In their complaint, the plaintiffs prayed the court to rule that "Castonguay, Cron
and Hall each has a constitutional right... to make the decision to terminate his
own suffering, and to seek his physician's assistance to do so, under the
circumstances of this case" and to issue a "temporary and permanent injunction
prohibiting the State Attorneys from prosecuting Dr. Mclver under Section 782.08,
or any other Florida criminal statute, for engaging in the conduct specifically found
by the Court's declaratory judgment to be constitutionally protected[.]" See
Complaint in Mclver v. Krischer, No. CL-96-1504-AF, 1997 WL 225878 (Fla. Cir.
Ct. Jan. 31, 1997).




know how to use medications to successfully induce a quick and
painless death;
(7) Dr. Mclver's professional judgment was that granting Mr.
Hall's request for a lethal prescription would be medically and
ethically appropriate.218
Choosing to follow the Second Circuit's Quill decision, the trial
court ruled that physician-assisted suicide was protected by the Equal
Protection Clause. 19 The court entered declaratory judgment for the
plaintiffs, enjoined the State from interference with Dr. Mclver's
assistance, and ordered that Dr. Mclver may prescribe Mr. Hall lethal
drugs "only after consultation and determination by both physician
and patient that Mr. Hall is (1) competent, (2) imminently dying, and
(3) prepared to die. '220 The court added:
It bears noting that Dr. Mclver approached this issue
in the manner that is appropriate, by seeking a
declaratory judgment while refusing to break the law.
This demonstrates respect for the system, in contrast
to the conduct, as reported in the media, of Dr. Jack
Kevorkian, who plunges ahead based on his personal
beliefs, with no oversight, and then dares the
authorities to prosecute him. Dr. Mclver's approach,
unlike that of Dr. Kevorkian, has enabled this Court to
fully determine the facts underlying his patients. [sic]
Our society and legal system would certainly not be
well served by forcing a person such as Dr. Mclver to
218 Id
219 Id. The court also determined that the right was protected under the Florida
State Constitution's Privacy Amendment, which states in part, "[e]very natural
person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his
private life except as otherwise provided herein." Id. (citing FLA. CONST. art. I,
§ 23).
220 Id The trial court "emphasized that the findings, decision, and direction in this
case relate to these parties only[.]" Id
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conduct himself in the manner of Dr. Kevorkian in
order to obtain an adjudication of the constitutional
issue Dr. McIver raises."
Of course, the plaintiffs had initiated their suit long before the
Supreme Court's Glucksberg and Quill decisions, and thus they could
not have known to plead and prove the intricacies which Justice
Stevens's conception of a colorable claim would require. 2 Still, most
of those intricacies had been either alleged in Mr. Hall's complaint or
found as fact at trial regardless.2 3 Mr. Hall's suit would therefore
appear to be the closest example of Justice Stevens's paradigm case
yet, decided even before the Supreme Court's decisions were
released.
Nevertheless, the Florida Supreme Court reversed the trial
court's ruling on expedited appeal and disposed of the federal
challenges citing, with virtually no discussion, the just-announced
Glucksberg and Quill decisions.224 The court neither mentioned
Footnotes 24 and 13, nor considered the State's interests as applied
to the specific plaintiffs, despite the fact that the suit was, apparently,
the very particularized challenge those footnotes describe.2 5 Whether
the Krischer court's failure to discuss the "open door" was
inadvertent or deliberate is unclear. Either way, of course, Krischer
may be the first example of the failure of Justice Stevens's case-by-
2' Id. at n.4.
See discussion supra Part IV.B.
The only allegations Mr. Hall had not made which would be important under
a Footnote 13 challenge included attestations that Dr. Mclver's intention was
merely to obey Mr. Hall's wishes rather than to induce his death, see supra note
193, that Mr. Hall would not feel his doctor-patient relationship with Dr. Mclver
would suffer as a result of the assistance, see supra note 201 and accompanying
text, and that Mr. Hall's decision was unmotivated by financial considerations. See
supra note 203 and accompanying text.
2" See Krischer v. Mclver, 697 So.2d 97, 100 (Fla. 1997). The panel also reversed
the trial court's ruling under the Florida State Constitution. Id at 100-04; see supra
note 219.
' See discussion supra Part III.
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case system to develop. A concurring judge in Krischer, who like his
colleagues neglected to undertake any particularized calculus,
nonetheless commented:
In reality, this Court may never be able to find an
exception for an as applied challenge to the statute
until extensive evaluation of the problems involved in
this issue occurs and the many difficult questions are
answered. The public would be much better served if
the legislature, with significant input from the medical
and scientific community, would craft appropriate
exceptions to the general prohibition of assisted
suicide, which include suitable standards, definitions,
and procedures ensuring that the use of assisted
suicide would truly be used [sic] to assist only those
individuals who suffer unbearable pain in the face of
certain death.226
Despite Justice Stevens's suggestions for a particularized as-applied
challenge, lower courts may be unlikely to see past the decisive
majority holdings in Glucksberg and Quill.227 In light of Krischer, a
plaintiff seeking judicial permission for suicide assistance might
therefore have to force a court to address the "open door" by invoking
Footnotes 24 and 13 explicitly and by framing her pleadings and
supporting affidavits in strict accordance with Justice Stevens's
Glucksberg concurrence. Only then will it be seen whether such a
challenge can succeed.2 '
226 Krischer, 697 So.2d at 107 (Overton, J., concurring).
z See supra text accompanying notes 107-09.
z As of the date this Comment went to press, the only other court yet to rely on
the substantive holdings of Glucksberg and Quill is the Washington Supreme Court
in Seeley v. Washington, 940 P.2d 604 (Wash. 1997). There, the facial and as-
applied constitutional challenges brought against a statute which forbid a cancer
patient from smoking marijuana to relieve the painful effects of chemotherapy were
rejected. Like Mr. Hall in Krischer, the plaintiff had initiated the lawsuit before
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V. CONCLUSION
On June 26, 1997, the United States Supreme Court
unanimously declared that the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution does not prohibit the states from enacting laws making
it a crime for physicians to assist the suicides of their terminally ill,
mentally competent patients.229 That same day, a jury in Florida
acquitted a doctor charged with first-degree murder for injecting a
massive dose of morphine, valium, and potassium chloride into a
cancer patient in severe pain and within days of death, and
inaccurately recording the action in medical records.2 ° Also that
same day, the body of a Nevada woman who had suffered from a
painful condition known as chronic fatigue syndrome was discovered
in a motel room near Detroit, Michigan with a note pinned to her
clothes instructing authorities to contact Jack Kevorkian's attorney."
Although the Supreme Court has proclaimed that there is no
generalized "right to die," people throughout the nation continue to
exercise that right.
Some of these people may eventually do so legally by invoking
Footnotes 24 and 13 of the Court's Glucksberg and Quill opinions,
which Laurence Tribe has proclaimed as the vehicle for future federal
constitutional challenges-an "open door."232 These persons "could
prevail in a more particularized challenge" than those the Court has
rejected, apparently by petitioning courts to assess their individual
circumstances for evidence that the State's legitimate interests in a
blanket prohibition of physician-assisted suicide do not apply to
Glucksberg and Quill were issued and he thus could not have attempted to
articulate a "particularized" challenge.
' Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct.
2258 (1997).
230 Sue Landry, Jury Acquits Sebring Doctor in Murder Trial, Ledger (Lakeland,
Fla.), June 27, 1997, at Al. The jury deliberated for approximately four-and-one-
half hours. Id
21 Kevorkian Lawyer Hired in Death Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1997, at 1-10.
132 See supra notes 3 and 17.
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themselves personally. 3 Of course, the Court does not purport to
reach the question of whether or not the Constitution would compel
the granting of such a request, and offers little guidance to courts and
potential litigants on the matter. Rather than opening the door, the
Court merely unlocked it-the concurrences did so hesitantly, the
majority grudgingly. The only subsequent lower-court "particularized
challenge" brought against an assisted suicide statute has failed,
without so much as an acknowledgment of the door's existence.234 It
is unclear whether patients and other courts will similarly fail to
explore the dimensions of this door. What is 'clear is only that, as
Justice Stevens recognized, "[fluture cases will determine whether
such a challenge may succeed. 235
" See discussion supra Part IV.A-B.
14 See discussion, supra Part IV.C.
"5 Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2309 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgments); accord Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d
790, 836 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) ("Whatever the outcome here, a host of painful
and agonizing issues involving the right to die will continue to confront the
courts.").
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